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Instead of just focusing on the effect of exchange rate 
levels (undervalued or overvalued exchange rates) on 
trade, this paper provides an analysis of the effects of 
exchange rate volatility levels on international trade. 
Intuitively, an increase in exchange rate volatility leads 
to uncertainty for agents participating in international 
trade, and such uncertainty might have a negative impact 
on international trade flows and participation, thereby 
reducing the advantages of world-wide specialization. 
This is especially crucial for countries where exchange 
rate derivatives markets are not yet well developed and 
This paper is a product of the Emerging Global Trends Team, Development Economics Prospect Group. It is part of a 
larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at gmundaca@worldbank.org.
the costs of hedging exchange rate risk are very high. 
The model here considers optimal decisions about 
participation in international trade under uncertainty 
about the exchange rate. The main conclusion is 
that a high level of exchange rate volatility can deter 
entrepreneurs from becoming exporters, even though 
exporting can be highly profitable. For those already 
participating in international trade, it is opposite: they 
may, optimally, choose not to leave the market even 
though staying in this market is highly unprofitable in 
the short run.Exchange rate uncertainty and optimal participation 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Recent  developments  of  the  international  monetary  system  have  reinvigorated  the 
policy debate over the   pros and cons of different current exchange rate regimes. One 
topical issue in this recent debate is the effects of undervalued exchange rates on 
trade, a policy that has been followed by export-led countries to achieve economic 
growth. These economies are expected to move toward more flexible exchange rates, 
thus making it easier for each of these countries to insulate themselves from foreign 
shocks and benefit from a more independent monetary policy. Instead of just focusing 
on the effect of exchange rate levels (undervalued or overvalued exchange rates) on 
trade, this note provides an analysis of the effects of exchange rate volatility levels on 
international  trade.  Intuitively,  an  increase  in  exchange  rate  volatility  leads  to 
uncertainty for agents participating in international trade, and such uncertainty might 
have a negative impact on trade flows, thereby reducing the advantages of world-wide 
specialization.  
I assume that firms are risk-averse, which implies that they care about not only 
their  expected  profits  but  also  the  risk  premium  associated  with  their  returns  to 
exporting. The exchange rate variance will then be an important component in the 
objective function of the exporters. Optimal decisions made by participants regarding 
whether to participate or not in international trade depend on the (upper and lower) 
margins of variance of the exchange rate. The latter represents uncertainty which I 
consider to be particularly crucial for new young firms that evaluate whether or not to 
participate  in  trade  markets.  The  analysis  of  such  issues  represents  a  notable 
contribution to the literature. The costs of entry for firms entering the export market 
are assumed different from the costs of exit for those already in the market.  
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Krugman (1989) and Dixit (1989a) are those in the literature closest to the 
approach proposed here. Their approaches are however limited to studying only how 
the distance between the highest and the lowest levels of the exchange rate (e.g. the 
width of the exchange rate band) might affect firms’ participation in international 
trade. It is then important again to stress that in Krugman’s and Dixit’s models, only 
the highest and lowest value of the exchange rate levels matters. Note that in their 
model, in contrast to what I present here, risk aversion does not play an important role 
and as a consequence neither the exchange rate volatility. Both authors assume that 
the exchange rate follows a Brownian motion process. They study cases where the 
possibility of exiting or entering the international trade markets has an option value 
for the firms. These firms may or may not exercise their options to enter into or to exit 
from international trade markets.  
The model proposed here then represents a relevant alternative which provides 
new  insight  into  the  relationship  between  international  trade  and  exchange  rate 
volatility through the exchange rate volatility channel. Considering that the exporting 
firms’ decisions to enter and exit the export market depend on both the level and 
variance  of  the  exchange  rate  is  important,  unless  the  fluctuation  area  for  the 
exchange rate becomes common knowledge to the public, as in the regime of target 
zones for the exchange rate. My approach becomes essential for cases in which it is 
difficult  to  predict  the  equilibrium  level  of  the  exchange  rate  (including  cases  in 
which the exchange rate follows a random walk). After all, it is well known that it is 
less  troublesome  to  predict  the  variance  than  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate,  and 
entrepreneurs would rationally take advantage of such information.   
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On the empirical front, there is yet no strong consensus on the relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and trade.
1 Several factors can explain this tenuous 
relationship: (i) the availability of hedging techniques  could  make it possible for 
traders to avoid most  of the potential exchange risk at little cost; (ii) there could be 
substantial pricing to market which implies that firms selling goods in other countries 
do not have the prices charged in the importing country changed as much as one 
might otherwise expect; and iii) firms planning to enter the export sector incur sunk 
costs,  that  is,  substantial  investments  in  resources  to  adapt  their  products  to  the 
foreign markets, in market development and distribution networks, and in creating 
production capability geared at foreigners’ preferences.  
  
2.  The Model 
Consider a risk-averse firm that is able to sell a good in the foreign market. Whenever 
a firm decides to participate in international trade, it needs to incur a fixed cost F
I in 
domestic currency. F
I is sunk after being incurred. A firm that reenters in the export 
market will need to incur another such a cost. While a firm that continues being an 
exporter faces another fixed cost, F
O. F
I is assumed to be larger than F
O, which means 
that the entry cost can be recovered on exit. Firms, whether they decide to produce to 
the domestic market or the export market, incur in variable costs equal to V which do 
not need to be related to the exchange rate. The decision to enter or exit the trade 
market is an investment decision that renders returns. We assume that these returns 
are  highly  correlated  with  the  level  of  the  exchange  rates.  Thus,  returns  become 
                                                 
1 Abrams (1980), Thursby and Thursby (1987) find large negative effects of nominal variability on 
trade; while Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) and Frankel (1997) report a negative but small effect. On 
the other hand, Rose (2000), Engel and Rose (2000), Frankel and Rose (2002), amd Alesina, Barro and 
Tenreyro  (2002)  find  that  the  effects  of  currency  unions  and  unilateral  dollarization  on  trade  are 
positive and large. Tenreyro (2004) finds that there is no effect of exchange rate variability on trade.  
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uncertain because of the exchange rate but not because of the prices of exported goods 
since firms practice the pricing to market policy.  







with corresponding probabilities. These series of possible returns, are represented by 
 
I r  , have expected value equals to θ
I (E[
I r (θ)]=θ
I), and variance σ
2,I, and they are 
the same for all firms entering (or reentering) the export market. The potential returns 




2,  …,  r
O
n  also  with  corresponding 
probabilities. We shall represent these returns by   
O r  . Similarly, these returns have 
mean θ
O and variance, σ
2,O. Also here θ
O and σ
2 are equal for all firms considering 
continuing  being  exporters.  The  differences  in  the  distributions  may  be  due  to 
entrepreneurs that are already in the market having different opportunities to manage 
exchange rate risk and information from those already in the market. The return for 
only selling in the domestic market is however a certain price one and equals P.  
Each entrepreneur has an initial income equal to W0 > 1, and a CARA
2 utility 
function. 
The entrepreneur that evaluates entering (or reentering) the trade markets has 
the following expected utility out of net returns minus the sunk costs (W0 – F
I -V + 
()
I r  ): 
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I I I I I Eu W F V r u W F V             

             (1a) 
(1/2
2,I) is the risk premium he would be willing to give up rather than face the 
exchange rate risk. With a CARA utility function, this risk premium depends on the 
variance of the uncertain return. 
                                                 
2 CARA stands for Constant Absolute Risk Aversion. 
3 The derivation of (1a) is not reported due to space constraint.   
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An entrepreneur that remains in the export market has the following expected 
utility out of returns minus the costs of staying the market (W0 – F
O -V+  ()
I r  ): 






O O O O Eu W F V r u W F V             

             (1b) 
(1/2
2,O) is also a risk premium for this type of entrepreneur. 
An  entrepreneur  who  only  participates  in  the  domestic  market  will  obtain 
utility equal to u(W0 - V + P).  
An entrepreneur will choose to continue participating in or entering the export 
market if, by doing so, he derives a higher utility than the one selling only in the 
domestic market. We translate this into the following conditions: 
 
An entrepreneur will enter the market if: 





I I I u W F V        

 >  u(W0 – V + P);             (2a) 
 
But (2a) is satisfied if: 
  
I > P + F
I + 1/2 
2,I  = M
I                  (3a) 





O O O u W F V        

 >  u(W0 - V+P);             (2b) 
But (2b) is satisfied if: 
 
O > P + F
O + 1/2 
2,O  = M




O are the Marshallian trigger returns for entering and remaining in 
the export market, respectively (similar to Dixit (1989b)). At a return between M




O, a domestic firm does not take part in international trade, and a firm which is 
already active in international trade does not exit.  
Now, as the sunk cost, F
I, and the fixed cost of remaining being exporters, F
O, 




2,O tend to P, the return to participating 
only in the domestic market. The inequalities (3a) and (3b) will remain even when F
I 
or F
O becomes zero. That is, if the sunk costs for the entrepreneur evaluating whether 
to participate in international trade, F
I,
 becomes zero, the entering trigger θ
I – 1/2
2,I 
has to be still above P. In addition, for a firm knowing that by not participating in 
international  trade  now,  it  can  avoid  F
O  for  being  an  exporter  whenever  future 
development  of  the  exchange  rate  level  and  volatility  turn  unfavorable.  It  is  also 
important to notice that the greater the range of uncertainty in the exchange rate 
(greater variances 
2,I and 




Therefore, the exchange rate volatility is the major variable that exporters will 
take into account to make optimal decisions about their participation in international 
markets, and possibly to adjust to relative changes in international relative prices to be 
able to remain exporting.  
 
3.  Conclusions 
I have presented a model  of optimal decisions about  participation in  international 
trade under uncertainty about the exchange rate. The main conclusion from the model 
is that the greater the volatility levels of the exchange rate, the higher are the trigger 
returns at which it becomes optimal to enter or respectively exit the export market.  
A consequence of this result is that a high level of exchange rate volatility can 
deter certain entrepreneurs from becoming exporters, even though exporting can be  
 
8 
highly profitable. For those already participating in international trade, it is opposite: 
they  may,  optimally,  choose  not  to  leave  the  market  even  though  staying  in  this 
market is highly unprofitable in the short run. 
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